The theory of cooperative games with transferable utility offers useful insights into the way parties can share gains from cooperation and secure sustainable agreements, see e.g. one of the books by Chakravarty, Mitra and Sarkar (2015, ISBN:978-1107058798) or by Driessen (1988, ISBN:978-9027727299) for more details. A comprehensive set of tools for cooperative game theory with transferable utility is provided. Users can create special families of cooperative games, like e.g. bankruptcy games, cost sharing games and weighted voting games. There are functions to check various game properties and to compute five different set-valued solution concepts for cooperative games. A large number of point-valued solution concepts is available reflecting the diverse application areas of cooperative game theory. Some of these point-valued solution concepts can be used to analyze weighted voting games and measure the influence of individual voters within a voting body. There are routines for visualizing both set-valued and point-valued solutions in the case of three or four players.